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Abstract
Environmental policy is often implemented using market instruments. In some cases, including carbon taxing, the links
between financial products and the environmental objectives, are transparent. In other cases, including water markets, the
links are less transparent. In Australia’s Murray–Darling Basin (MDB), financial water products are known as ‘entitlements’,
and are similar to traditional financial products, such as shares. The Australian water market includes ‘Low Security’
entitlements, which are similar to ‘sub-prime’ mortgage bonds because they are unlikely to yield an amount equal to their
financial worth. Nearly half the water purchased under the Murray–Darling Basin Plan for environmental purposes is ‘Low
Security’. We suggest that the current portfolio of water held by the Australian Government for environmental purposes
reflects the mortgage market in the lead-up to the global financial crisis. Banks assumed that the future value of the mortgage
market would reflect past trends. Similarly, it is assumed that the future value of water products will reflect past trends,
without considering climate change. Historic records of allocations to ‘Low Security’ entitlements in the MDB suggest that,
in the context of climate change, the Basin Plan water portfolio may fall short of the target annual average yield of 2075 GL
by 511 GL. We recommend adopting finance sector methods including ‘hedging’ ‘Low Security’ entitlements by purchasing
an additional 322–2755 GL of ‘Low Security’, or 160–511 GL of ‘High Security’ entitlements. Securing reliable
environmental water is a global problem. Finance economics present opportunities for increasing the reliability of
environmental flows.
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Highlights
● Water markets and associated products, such as ‘water
entitlements’ are often used to reallocate resources for
environmental purposes.
● The reliability of water entitlements varies; some are
‘Low Security’ meaning they are unlikely to receive full
allocations in most years, while others are ‘high security’
meaning they are more likely to receive full allocations.
● ‘Low Security’ entitlements operate similarly to ‘sub-
prime’ mortgage bonds.
● Nearly half of the water entitlements purchased under the
Murray–Darling Basin Plan for environmental recovery
are ‘Low Security’.
● In the context of climate change, ‘Low Security’
entitlements are likely to yield considerably less than
the official Murray–Darling Basin Authority estimates.
Thus, the Basin Plan portfolio is likely to fall short of the
annual average target of 2075 GL by up to 511 GL.
● Finance economics suggest avenues for improving the
reliability of the Basin Plan portfolio, such as ‘hedging’
which would involve purchasing an additional
322–2755 GL of ‘Low Security’, or 160–511 GL of
‘High Security’ entitlements.
● The reliability of water entitlements is as important to the
success of environmental management as purchasing the
entitlements.
● The low reliability of environmental water entitlements is
a global problem. Lessons from the global financial crisis
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may offer some solutions for ensuring water markets are
effective means of improving ecological condition in
degraded river basins.
Introduction
A characteristic of 21st century environmental policy is the
use of economic instruments and theories to allocate scarce
natural resources (Costanza et al. 1997), such as water
(Simpson and Ringskog, 1997), and to address environ-
mental problems, such as climate change (Nordhaus 1994).
Some common examples include cap-and-trade policies to
reduce water consumption in over-allocated basins (e.g.,
Thompson et al. 2009), including Australia’s
Murray–Darling Basin (MDB) (e.g,. Garrick et al. 2009),
pollution taxes (Eskeland and Devarajan 1996; Goulder and
Parry, 2008), including carbon taxes (e.g., Nordhaus 1993;
Poterba 1991), offsets (Sullivan 2013), including biodi-
versity offsets (e.g., Coralie et al. 2015), and mitigation
banking for wetland (Hallwood 2007; Zedler and Callaway
1999) and stream restoration (Lave 2018; Lave et al. 2018).
To be effective, these approaches require transparency,
accountability of the parties involved, accounting and
monitoring and information such as the amount of water
extracted from river basins under a cap-and-trade system, or
the number of hectares of wetland necessary to replace the
ecosystem services lost as a result of habitat destruction
(e.g., Brown and Lant 1999).
The MDB, Australia is an example where the Australian
Government implemented a number of economic instru-
ments designed to allocate water more efficiently and sus-
tainably, as well as protecting and restoring the health of
the river system. These instruments included a cap and
trade system, coupled with the recovery of environmental
water through purchases of water rights. In this paper we
evaluate an important aspect of the Australian Govern-
ment’s approach to purchasing water for environmental
restoration in the MDB, as articulated in the
Murray–Darling Basin Plan (the Plan) (Murray–Darling
Basin Authority 2019a, b). We suggest that a key challenge
has been translating policy into practice, in this case,
appropriate economic mechanisms of water allocation. The
central premise of this paper is that the low reliability of
nearly half of the water purchased for environmental flows
represents a challenge to achieving the environmental
objectives of the Basin Plan.
Some economic approaches to resource allocation
involve relatively straight forward underlying principles,
such as carbon offset trading. While there are many debates
about the complexity and geographic implications of carbon
offsetting (Bumpus and Liverman 2008), in theory, a
license permitting a set amount of carbon emissions can be
sold and purchased anywhere in the world because the net
outcome remains the same (Lovell and Liverman 2010).
One unit of carbon trading is the equivalent of 1 metric
tonne of carbon emissions regardless of geographic loca-
tion, or the source of emissions. Thus, the link between the
market product (a license) and the environmental asset
(carbon emissions) is transparent1.
In other cases, such as mitigation wetland banking
(Hallwood 2007; Zedler and Callaway 1999), the link
between the market product, and the environmental asset, is
much less tangible. This is because the value of traded units
varies according to allocated ‘determinations’. For example,
under Section 404 of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, the US Federal Government permits indivi-
duals or companies to destroy natural wetlands on the
condition that they compensate the loss by creating an equal
amount of wetland of comparable quality (Robertson 2004).
A company may destroy 100 hectares of high-quality wet-
land, and compensate by creating 200 hectares of 50%
ecologically functional wetland. Modelling involving
complex algorithms is used to establish the quality of the
wetland, and thus the allocated ‘determination’ of the asset;
if the wetland is 50% functional, the determination is 0.5%
per hectare (Robertson 2004). Thus, the party responsible
must create twice as much mitigation wetland as the
amount lost.
This approach to mitigation wetland banking has been
heavily criticised for a number of reasons, including the fact
that the ecological modelling involves substantial uncer-
tainties (e.g., Brown and Lant 1999; Burgin 2008; Robert-
son 2004). Hectares of wetland of variable quality are
pooled together under the assumption that a certain amount
of low-quality wetland will result in the equivalent bio-
physical function of a target amount of high-quality wet-
land. Furthermore, it is assumed that modelling can be used
to identify the ratio of how many low-quality hectares equal
one high-quality hectare. To be effective, a large enough
amount of low-quality wetland must be established
to ‘hedge’ the risk associated with low ecological
functionality.
A similar logic to mitigation wetland banking underlies
the Australian Government’s approach to reclaiming water
for environmental purposes in the MDB. In both cases,
large amounts of low-quality assets are assumed to be equal
to a smaller amount of high-quality assets. In this paper we
present an analysis of the MDB environmental water
recovery, explore the implications of using ‘High’ and
‘Low’ security water entitlements for future environmental
1 We acknowledge that this assumption has been widely critiqued.
However, the link between the financial product and the environmental
asset is considerably more transparent than other examples of
offsetting.
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water security, and provide key recommendations based on
lessons from the financial sector. In the following we
present:
● An overview of the approaches used to provide
environmental water in the MDB;
● A brief history of the institutional origins of different
security water classes;
● An analysis of all available ‘Low Security’ entitlement
allocation records in the MDB (between 2002 and
2018), including calculation of likely future yields,
particularly in the context of climate change; and
● Some recommendations for increasing the security of
environmental water.
Major Water Reform in the MDB
The MDB is located in south-eastern Australia, and contains
the nation’s longest river system, including the Murray and
Darling rivers, and their tributaries (Fig. 1). The Basin
covers approximately 1 million sq km and runs through the
States of South Australia, New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. Like many
major river systems globally, the MDB has a history of
extensive development, large scale irrigation infrastructure
and increasing volumes of water extraction. Agricultural
production in the Basin consumes ~60% of agricultural
water used in the nation, and generates nearly 40% of all
income from the agricultural sector in Australia (Leblanc
et al. 2012). Over the past 100 years, the ecology, hydrol-
ogy and geomorphology of the MDB system has been
fundamentally altered by impoundment, diversions,
extraction, vegetation clearing and the introduction of non-
native species of flora and fauna (e.g., Pittock and Finlayson
2011; Walker 1985; Walker and Thoms, 1993). As a con-
sequence, the system has seen large scale environmental
impacts with public and policy interest sparked by a number
of large algal blooms throughout 1991–1992 (Guest 2017).
The federal government took control of a number of
aspects of water management triggered by the destruction of
internationally recognised Ramsar wetlands (e.g., Kingsford
2000). Previously, natural resource management was the
jurisdiction of individual states. Following major environ-
mental problems, such as salinization and persistent
drought, the management of the MDB has increasingly been
Fig. 1 Map of the southern Murray–Darling Basin, Australia
Environmental Management
overseen by federal institutions, such as the
Murray–Darling Basin Commission, and later, the
Murray–Darling Basin Authority (MDBA). The Living
Murray project (TLM), established in 2002, was one of the
first collaborative environmental programmes initiated by
the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council under the
Murray–Darling Basin Commission. With ongoing dete-
rioration of the river system and mounting public concern,
the Water Act 2007 further cemented the federal govern-
ment’s role in managing the basin.
Under the Water Act 2007, the Government established a
federal agency, the MDBA who were responsible for
developing the Murray–Darling Basin Plan (the Basin
Plan). The two key mechanisms in the Basin Plan aimed at
addressing the degraded condition of the MDB are the
setting of a limit to the amount of water permitted for
extraction, known as the sustainable diversion limit (SDL),
and recovering water for environmental restoration, known
as ‘environmental water’. A second federal organisation, the
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH2),
was established under the Water Act 2007 to manage
environmental water.
In 2012, the MDBA released the Basin Plan, stipulating a
recovery target of 2750 gigalitres (GL) of water
(Murray–Darling Basin Authority 2019a, b). In 2018 this
target was revised downwards to 2075 GL (Murray–Darling
Basin Authority 2019a, b). While there has been much
debate over the recovery target (e.g., Cosier et al. 2012), the
legitimacy of the recovery target is not the focus of this
paper. We focus instead on how water recovery was
achieved. The two main mechanisms for water recovery
were through the water market by purchasing water ‘pro-
ducts’ known as entitlements, and by reducing the volume
of water extracted by the irrigation sector by funding irri-
gation efficiency projects, and returning water savings to the
Commonwealth for environmental watering. The objectives
of recovering water through these programmes were ‘mul-
tiple, poorly defined and at times conflicting’ (Horne et al.
2011, pg. 380), but included helping ease the transition to
the lower levels of water available to consumptive users as a
result of the SDL. The methods used to recover water were
based on both economic efficiency and political palatability
(Horne et al. 2011). There has been criticism of the effi-
ciency of the water recovery methods adopted by the
Australian Government, including the negative economic
impacts of recovering water through irrigation efficiency
upgrades rather than through purchasing directly through
the water market (e.g., Grafton and Horne, 2014; Qureshi
et al. 2011). While the focus of the recovery programme
was on the most efficient and politically palatable way to
recover water, the recovery target is a surrogate for how
much water is required to achieve particular environmental
outcomes.
The Basin Plan and water recovery targets do not
explicitly consider the implications of climate change.
However, the Basin Plan is an adaptive process with
reviews at regular intervals, and the consideration of climate
change is recognised as an essential improvement for the
next version in 2025. The analysis in this paper highlights
the importance of considering the type of product, (known
as ‘entitlements’) and the mechanisms that are used to
provide environmental water and how they will perform
under climate change. This type of analysis will be impor-
tant for informing the next round of policy settings.
The Security of Water Entitlements for
Environmental Flows in the MDB
The MDB has a complex set of formal water allocation
mechanisms. While the States retain ownership of water,
individual water users can hold a water right that gives them
legal entitlement to an annual allocation (similar to a divi-
dend) of water based on how much water is in storage
across the system at a particular time. The likely allocation
(or annual return) varies across individual rivers depending
on local climate, but there are also often a range of water
products within each system. Some entitlements are ‘High
Security’ while others are ‘Low Security’ (Ancev 2015).
The ‘security’ of water entitlements refers to the likelihood
that the full amount of water will be allocated to an enti-
tlement in any given year. The introduction of ‘High
Security’ and ‘Low Security’ entitlements for water allo-
cation in the MDB followed the establishment of a cap-and-
trade policy (the Cap) by the Federal Government. The
MDB diversions cap, limiting diversions to 1994 levels
(Quiggin 2001) was introduced in 1995 under the River
Murray Waters Agreement to address the over-allocation of
water in the system. Over-allocation meant that entitlement
holders were unable to receive full allocations. Thus, a net
reduction was required in the allocation of water to existing
entitlement holders. This could have been achieved by
revoking a proportion of existing entitlements. However,
the preferred approach was to implement a hierarchy of
entitlements. Existing entitlements were given a ‘rating’ to
indicate priority; in times of low rainfall and river flow,
water is allocated to high-priority entitlement-holders first,
and any remaining water is distributed between low-priority
entitlement-holders after that (Quiggin 2001). The termi-
nology adopted to describe low-priority entitlements varied
across the States of the MDB, called medium security in
Queensland, General Security in NSW and Low Security in
Victoria. However, these categories are equivalent to each
other in terms of likelihood of receiving full allocations.2 Now the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office.
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Thus, for the purposes of this paper, we refer to all low-
priority entitlements as ‘Low Security’, and high-priority
entitlements as ‘High Security’3.
‘Low Security’ entitlements were established on the
premise that those entitlements were unlikely to receive full
allocations in most years; only a proportion of the total
amount would be available for allocation to these entitle-
ments. At the beginning of the agricultural season, and
throughout the year, water authorities announce ‘determi-
nations’ for water entitlements in each sub-basin in the
MDB. Similar to the case of mitigation wetlands, water
entitlement determinants specify the ‘quality’ of the asset, in
this case, the amount of water per megalitre (ML) of an
entitlement that is available for use. Thus, an allocation of
100ML to a 100ML entitlement would be announced as a
determinant of ‘1’, while an allocation of 50ML to the same
entitlement would be announced as ‘0.5’. A ‘High Security’
entitlement for 100ML is likely to be allocated close to, if
not exactly, 100ML of water for use in a given year. A
‘Low Security’ entitlement is likely to receive a much
smaller proportion in any given year compared with ‘High
Security’ entitlements because ‘High Security’ entitlements
are allocated first, and any remaining water in storage is
divided between all other holdings.
Under the Basin Plan a portfolio of water entitlements
has been acquired for environmental watering, including
both ‘High Security’ and ‘Low Security’ entitlements. The
security of the water purchased by the CEWH under the
Basin Plan varies considerably. As of November 11th,
2019, the CEWH holds 2755 GL of registered water enti-
tlements (excluding ground water entitlements) for envir-
onmental purposes (Australian Government Department of
the Environment and Energy 2019).
In theory, purchasing a large amount of ‘Low Security’
entitlements should yield a reliable amount of water
equivalent to a smaller holding of ‘High Security’ entitle-
ments, particularly if the ‘Low Security’ entitlements are
purchased from a range of river basins. At any given time,
some entitlements should receive allocations. This approach
is a form of ‘hedging’ risk; the risk that any one ‘Low
Security’ entitlement will fail to produce water for envir-
onmental flows is ‘hedged’ by purchasing many of these
entitlements in a number of river basins. Hedging the risk of
‘Low Security’ water underpinned how the Australian
Government procured water for TLM Project. The TLM
involved acquiring entitlements to provide a long-term
annual average yield (LTAAY) of 500 GL for environ-
mental watering at six ‘icon’ sites of high ecological,
recreational, cultural and heritage value. To achieve a
LTAAY of 500 GL, the MDBA purchased ~975 GL worth
of water entitlements of varying security, including 870 GL
of ‘Low Security’ entitlements (570 GL of NSW ‘General
Security’ and ‘Supplementary’, and 300 GL of Victorian
‘Low Security’ entitlements), and 104 GL of ‘High Secur-
ity’ entitlements (2 GL from NSW, 58 GL from Victoria,
and 44 GL from South Australia) (Murray–Darling Basin
Authority 2011). Overall, of the target LTAAY of 500 GL,
104 GL was obtained by purchasing ‘High Security’ enti-
tlements, while the remaining 396 GL LTAAY was secured
by purchasing more than double this amount in ‘Low
Security’ entitlements. These figures were determined by
modelling which suggests that, based on 100 years of his-
torical river flow data, on average ‘Low Security’ entitle-
ments are likely to yield 0.5/ML, or half the amount of
water compared with the value, in MLs, of the entitlement.
Concerns about the reliability of these ‘Low Security’
entitlements, and the modelling and methods used to
determine long-term yields, were raised early in the plan-
ning phase of TLM Project (e.g., Cox et al. 2006). In some
cases, those concerns have been realised. For example,
Horne (2017) observes that, ‘Some [Living Murray] enti-
tlements, specifically the Victorian Goulburn Valley and
Murray Valley low reliability entitlements, have received a
total allocation of only 5 GL since becoming part of the
portfolio’. (p.1005). However, in theory, purchasing a large
amount of ‘Low Security’ entitlements should ‘hedge’ the
risk, and produce a long-term average close to 500 GL.
Importantly, the modelling used to determine the
LTAAY for both TLM and Commonwealth environmental
water holdings is based on historic climate, rainfall and
stream flow data, irrigation use, and dam storage. The
MDBA Hydrologic Modelling Report (Murray–Darling
Basin Authority 2012) specifies that long-term average
water availability scenarios related to reclaiming environ-
mental water were modelled using climate data covering the
period of 1895–2009. The modelling method to determine
LTAAY did not take into account climate change scenarios
(Murray–Darling Basin Authority 2012). Climate change
projections of rainfall indicate that the region of the MDB
may experience drier conditions into the future, such as the
conditions experienced during the recent 15-year period of
low rainfall (Dey et al. 2019). In this scenario, the amount
of water allocated to ‘Low Security’ entitlements over the
past 15 years may be more indicative of future yields
compared with MDBA estimations based on average cli-
matic conditions over the past 100 years (Australian Gov-
ernment Department of the Environment and Energy 2019).
Thus, if future rainfall is similar to the past 100 years,
estimates of yields of water per ML from ‘Low Security’
entitlements are likely to be accurate. However, in drier
conditions, such as the most recent 15 years, these estimates
3 Entitlements held by the CEWH under the Basin Plan do not include
any ‘Low Security’ entitlements in South Australia. Similarly, the
CEWH portfolio does not include entitlements in the Australian
Capital Territory.
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may be considerably higher than actual available alloca-
tions, and the amount of water allocated to the entitlements
held in the CEWH portfolio may fall short of the target
2075 GL. These concerns may also apply to the TLM water
entitlement portfolio.
In the following sections we investigate the amount of
water per ML allocated to ‘Low-Security’ entitlements in
the past 10–15 years in the MDB, and consider the impli-
cations for ‘Low Security’ allocations in the context of
climate change. We acknowledge that the past 10–15 years
may not be entirely indicative of future climatic conditions.
Our analysis is intended to demonstrate how the CEWH
portfolio may function in drier conditions.
Methods and Results
Our analysis of ‘Low Security’ entitlement allocations
draws on publically available data about the yearly ‘deter-
minants’ allocated to those entitlements in the states of the
MDB, specifically Queensland, New South Wales and
Victoria. The data period ranges from 2002 and 2018. We
used two approaches to consider whether ‘Low Security’
water entitlements purchased under the Basin Plan are likely
to yield an annual average amount of water close to the
target amount of 2075 GL. Firstly, we examined the amount
of ‘Low Security’ entitlements held under the Basin Plan
and established whether those entitlements were ‘hedged’
against the risk of low yields. Secondly, we examined the
history of allocation determinations, and calculated the
likely proportion of allocations to those entitlements in the
context of future climate scenarios, including the scenario in
which future climate reflects the past 100 years, and the
scenario in which future climate is similar to the past 15
years of low rainfall. The following summarises the meth-
ods used to conduct these analyses, and the results of each
approach.
Proportion of ‘Low Security’ Entitlements Held
under the Basin Plan
To identify the proportion of ‘Low Security’ entitlements
purchased under the Basin Plan, and to identify whether
these entitlements were ‘hedged’, we examined the register
of water entitlements held by the CEWH (Australian Gov-
ernment Department of the Environment and Energy 2019).
The approach taken for obtaining 500 GL LTAAY for TLM
project suggests that, in climatic conditions similar to that of
the past 100 years, ‘Low Security’ entitlements should yield
0.5/ML, or half the amount of water compared with the
amount of purchased entitlements. Thus, we assume that
double the amount of ‘Low Security’ entitlements is
required to ‘hedge’ risk in the context of the CEWH port-
folio. It is important to note that the current portfolio does
not represent full recovery; recovery is ongoing. We con-
sider the amount of additional water required to meet the
long-term average target of 2075 GL, and whether the
proportion of ‘Low Security’ entitlements is sufficient to
meet the target in the context of future climate change.
Table 1 summarises data obtained from the CEWH
register (Australian Government Department of the Envir-
onment and Energy, 2019), including the amount of ‘High
Security’ and ‘Low Security’ water entitlements held under
the Basin Plan, and the expected LTAAY, calculated using
modelling methods established by the MDBA. Expected
yield refers to the amount of water that the modelling
suggests will be allocated to an entitlement, as a proportion
of 1ML. Both ‘Low Security’ and ‘Other’ entitlements are
anticipated to yield approximately half the amount of water
as that held under entitlement4. These estimates are con-
sistent with the modelling used for TLM project which
indicated that a 1ML ‘Low Security’ entitlement should
yield approximately half a ML of water annually (0.5/ML).
However, the register indicates that the expected yield of
the total portfolio held under the Basin Plan (including both
‘High’ and ‘Low’ security entitlements) is only 1913 GL,
which is 162 GL below the 2075 GL target. Thus, at the
current time, the Basin Plan portfolio is only partially
‘hedged’ against the risk of low-yielding entitlements.
Water recovery for the Basin Plan portfolio is ongoing.
Given that ‘Low Security’ entitlements are expected to yield
approximately half the registered amount, an additional
324 GL of these entitlements would be required to achieve
the long-term annual average target.
Table 1 Summary of High, Low, and Othera entitlements held by the
CEWH under the Basin Plan, including expected yields based on
MDBA modelling
Security type Amount (ML) Expected yield
High 892,370 837,353
Low 1,092,440 632,977
Other 819,761 465,598
Total 2,804,571 1,935,928
a‘Other’ holdings refer to the combined total of holdings of varying
security that pertain to specific regions only. ‘Other’ Queensland
holdings include ‘Un-supplemented’, and ‘Overland’. ‘Other’ New
South Wales holdings include ‘Conveyance’, ‘Supplemented’, and
‘Unregistered’. ‘Other’ Victorian holdings include ‘Bulk’ entitlements
4 Examining the yield of ‘other’ entitlements, including conveyance
entitlements, is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we suggest
research is needed to explore the yields, and the implications for
environmental watering.
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Past Allocations and the Expected Yield of ‘Low
Security’ Entitlements in the Context of Climate
Change5
The modelling used to determine LTAAY is based on long-
term average rainfall data. However, by 2050 climate in the
MDB may be more similar to the past 15 years of low
rainfall and river flow (Dey et al. 2019). Thus, our second
approach was to obtain records of seasonal allocations to
‘Low Security’ or equivalent entitlements in NSW (New
South Wales Department of Industry 2019; Water NSW
2019), Victoria (Victoria State Government Department of
Land Water and Planning 2019) and Queensland (Personal
Communication, Sunwater Queensland, 12 March 20196).
This data was used to estimate the average historic alloca-
tion to ‘Low Security’ entitlements in sub-basins of the
MDB. These average values were used to calculate the
amount of water that is likely to be allocated to ‘Low
Security’ entitlements held under the Basin Plan in the
event that climatic conditions are similar to the past
15 years.
While there is evidence to suggest future climatic con-
ditions may be similar to the past 15 years (Dey et al. 2019),
we acknowledge that the extreme conditions characteristic
of the Millennium Drought (1996–2010) may impact our
analysis (e.g., Crase et al. 2012). Thus, we also investigated
whether there was a difference in the amount of water
allocated to ‘Low Security’ entitlements during the drought,
compared with following the drought in 2010.
An alternative approach could be to identify all periods
of drought and compare allocations during these periods to
all periods when drought has not occurred. Since 2010 there
have been multiple periods of drought, such as 2014–2015
when total inflows into the Murray River fell to 60%
compared with the long-term medium (Murray-Darling
Basin Authority, 2015). However, drought conditions can
occur for multiple years before reducing dam storage to the
point of severely impacting entitlement allocations (Van
Loon 2015). This is because the storage dams in the south
eastern MDB have a capacity of several times annual
average inflows, allowing for carryover of water stored from
a previous year for allocation and use in later years. Thus,
several years of meteorological drought (low precipitation)
can occur without severely reducing storage levels, and
thus, without impacting entitlement allocations (Craik and
Cleaver, 2008). For example, in the early phase of the
Millennium Drought in the sub-basins of Victoria in the
MDB (1996–2005) allocations to ‘Low Security’ entitle-
ments dropped from 80 to 54%. By comparison, the average
annual allocation to ‘Low Security’ entitlements in sub-
basins in Victoria between 2007 and 2019 ranged between
23% in the Campaspe and 0% in the Goulburn, Loddon and
Murray rivers. Therefore, our analysis compares allocations
to ‘Low Security’ entitlements during the Millennium
Drought to allocations after the cessation of the drought
because long periods of drought have a greater impact on
allocation determinants than short periods of drought.
Complete records of seasonal allocations to ‘Low
Security’ entitlements as a proportion of 1ML were
obtained for nine basins in NSW, three basins in Queens-
land, and five basins in Victoria (Table 3). The range of
years for which allocation data was available varied
between States, as demonstrated in Table 2, and also
annually in single States. For example, in NSW, records
from 2015 include allocation values for the months April to
December, while records from 2016 include values for the
months January to December.
Increasing allocation announcements are made through-
out the irrigation season as new inflows enter storage, often
with multiple allocation increases announced in a single
month. For this reason the highest value for each month was
taken as the final monthly allocation.
In total, we analysed 690 monthly announcements about
allocations to ‘Low Security’ water entitlements over the
years 2002–2018 from NSW (N= 412), Victoria (N= 72)
and Queensland (N= 205). Using this data we calculated
the long-term average allocation of ‘Low Security’ entitle-
ments to each individual basin as a proportion (0–1). Table 3
summarises the number of ‘Low Security’ entitlements held
by the CEWH in each basin (ML), the long-term average
yield of those entitlements based on MDBA modelling
(ML), as well as the long-term allocation based on our
analysis of actual allocation data, the average amount of
water those allocations would yield, and the difference
between MDBA-modelled yields and our calculations.
Table 2 Basins in NSW,
Queensland and Victoria for
which ‘Low Security’ allocation
data were obtained7
State Basins Years
NSW Gwydir, Lachlan, Lower Darling, Macquarie-Castlereagh, Murrumbidgee, Naomi,
NSW Boarder Rivers, NSW Murray and Peel
2004–2018
QLD Condamine and Balonne, QLD Border Rivers and Warrego–Paroo–Bulloo–Nebine 2002–2018
VIC Broken, Campaspe, Goulburn, Loddon and Murray 2007–2019
5 Historic allocation data is available as supplementary material.
6 All seasonal allocations and determinations for the state of
Queensland were provided by the Sunwater Water Accounting
Department in personal email communication.
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The data presented in Table 3 were used to calculate the
future yield of all entitlements reported in the CEWH reg-
ister associated with the Basin Plan target of 2075 GL. We
multiplied the average allocation proportion by the amount
of ML of ‘Low Security’ water held in each basin to
determine the likely yield of those entitlements under cli-
mate conditions similar to the past 15 years. For example,
the long-term average allocation of water to ‘Low Security’
entitlements in the Murray Basin of NSW is 0.09/ML, and
the amount of water held under those entitlements is
369,629ML. The result of multiplying these values is
34,566.09 ML, indicating a 223,804.9 ML shortfall between
the long-term average annual yield estimated on the basis of
MDBA modelling for the NSW Murray, and the likely yield
based on recent allocations.
These figures were then used to determine the difference
between official predictions of future yield from all enti-
tlements held in the CEWH compared with our calculations
based on historic allocations to ‘Low Security’ entitlements.
Table 4 shows the amount of entitlements of ‘Low’, ‘High’
and ‘Other’ security water held in NSW, Victoria and
Queensland under the Basin Plan, expected LTAAY yield
based on MDBA estimates, as well as expected yield based
on our calculations of average annual allocation to ‘Low
Security’ entitlements over the past 10–15 years, as a pro-
portion of 1ML.
Overall, 1,092,440 ML of ‘Low Security’ water entitle-
ments are held under the Basin Plan, combining entitle-
ments from NSW, Victoria and Queensland. The MDBA
calculates a LTAAY of 623, 977ML using modelling that
suggests these ‘Low Security’ entitlements should yield
~0.5/ML. Based on historic allocations, over the last 15
years, to ‘Low Security’ entitlements, we calculate an
average annual yield of only 122, 237ML, and thus a
shortfall of 510, 737ML compared with MDBA estimates.
On average, across all basins, ‘Low Security’ entitlements
yield only 0.12/ML in Victoria, 0.21/ML in NSW and 0.7/
ML in QLD. Overall, in climatic conditions similar to the
past 15 years, we estimate an average annual yield of
1,402,620 ML from the 2,804,571 ML of entitlements held
under the Basin Plan. Thus, if future climatic conditions in
the MDB reflect the last 15 years, it is possible that the
CEWH portfolio may yield as little as 50% of the total
entitlement, compared with 68% based on the long-term
historical average.
The annual average allocations to ‘Low Security’ entitle-
ments in NSW, Queensland and Victoria, as a proportion of
1ML, are presented in Fig. 2. Over the period for which
Table 3 The number of ‘Low
Security’ entitlements held by
the CEWH in QLD, NSW and
VIC basins, including the
average yield predicted on the
basis of MDBA modelling, the
average allocation calculated
using available allocation data
between 2002 and 2018, average
yield based on allocation data,
and the difference in expected
yield between MDBA modelling
and predictions based on
available data
State Basin Entitlements
held by
CEWH (ML)
Long-term
average yield
based on MDBA
modelling (ML)
Long-term
average
allocation
based on
actual data
(as
% of ML)
Long-term
average
yield based
on actual
data (ML)
Difference
between
MDBA-
modelled yield
and yield
based on
actual
data (ML)
QLD Border rivers 15,540 5241 0.71 11,009.85 +5768.85
St. George 45 43 0.70 31.53 −11.47
NSW Border rivers 2806 946 0.40 1134.11 +188.09
Gwydir 86,923 34,020 0.12 10,589.59 −23,430.41
Lachlan 86,923 34,422 0.14 12,096.78 −22,325.22
Lower Darling 21,564 20,076 0.45 9,605.78 −10,470.22
Macquarie/
Cudgegong
126,224 65,132 0.11 13,649.8 −51,482.2
Murray 369,629 258,371 0.09 34,566.09 −223,804.9
Murrumbidgee 286,467 169,302 0.09 25,923.5 −143,378.5
Nanoi (upper
and lower)
13,653 10,281 0.23 3,171.73 −7109.27
Peel 1257 263 0.29 367.49 +104.49
VIC Broken 4 3 0.38 1.52 −1.48
Campaspe 395 194 0.23 89.2 −104.8
Goulburn 42,467 19,265 0 0 −19,265
Loddon 527 142 0 0 −142
Murray 35,413 15,276 0 0 −15,276
Total 1,074,297 632,977 NA 122,237 −510,740
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records are available, ‘Low Security’ entitlements in
Queensland received the highest allocations. By comparison,
allocations in Victoria and NSW were lower, and similar.
Three t-tests were computed to test the difference in mean
water (M) allocated to ‘Low Security’ entitlements after the
cessation of the Millennium Drought compared with during
drought years. The results indicate that there was no dif-
ference between the amount of water allocated to ‘Low
Security’ entitlements in river basins in NSW after (M=
0.19, SD= 0.29) and during (M= 0.14, SD= 0.23) the
drought, t(410)=−1.7, P= 0.076. Similarly, there was no
difference between the amount of water allocated to ‘Low
Security’ entitlements in river basins in Victoria after (M=
0.23, SD= 0.34) and during (M= 0.13, SD= 0.34) the
drought, t(70)=−1.24, P= 0.22. In contrast, analysis
revealed that more water was allocated to ‘Low Security’
entitlements in river basins in Queensland after the end of
the drought (M= 0.7, SD= 0.36), compared with during the
drought (M= 0.6, SD= 0.36), t(204)=−2.23, P= 0.027.
The P values for these three analyses are displayed in Fig. 2.
Table 4 Summary of: amount of
‘High’, ‘Low’, and ‘Other’
entitlement holdings in the
Murray–Darling Basin held by
the Commonwealth
Environmental Water Holder
(CEWH), expected long-term
annual average yield (LTAAY),
long-term average percentage
(%) of allocation per Megalitre
(ML) in Queensland, New South
Wales and Victoria based on
past allocation data, expected
average annual yield based on
past allocation data, and
difference between expected
LTAAY and expected yields.
South Australia ‘High Security’
included, and groundwater
entitlements excluded for
accuracy
Region Water product
(Entitlement
security)
Entitlement
holdings
registered with
CEWH (ML)
Long-term average annual yield (ML)
Modelled
(based on
MDBA
modellinga)
Actual (based
on entitlement
allocation
data from
2002 to 2018)
Difference
between
modelled and
actual long-
term annual
yield (ML)
QLD High 0 0
Low 15,585 5284 11,041 +5757
Other 237,992 121,911
Total 253,577 127,195 132,952
%
Expected yield
50 52
NSW High 40,555 36,561
Low 998,049 592,810 111,105 −481,705
Other 553,769 298,551
Total 1,592,372 927,922 446,217
%
Expected yield
58 28
VIC High 690,398 655,517
Low 78,807 34,880 91 −34,789
Other 28,000 22,568
Total 797,205 712,965 678,176
%
Expected yield
89 85
SA High 161,417 145,276
– – –
– – –
Whole
Murray–Darling Basin
High 892,370 837,353
Low 1,092,440 623,977 122,237 −510,737
Other 819,761 443,030
Total 2,804,571 1,913,360 1,402,620
%
Expected yield
68 50
Total after
removing the
shortfall
1,402,620
% Expected
yield after
removing the
shortfall
50.01
aEstimates sourced from CEWH register, September, 2019
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Discussion
The establishment of water entitlements and water markets
is a common response to scarcity. This approach has been
adopted to reallocate water resources between competing
users in the United States of America (e.g., Marston and Cai
2016), China (e.g., Wang et al. 2018) and elsewhere (Endo
et al. 2018). To our knowledge, the determination of ‘Low’
and ‘High’ security entitlements is unique to the Australian
water market. However, similar economic instruments
operate elsewhere and present similar challenges for water
management. In the Limarí River and Diguillín River basins
of Chilé, the water market has been used to transfer irri-
gation rights to achieve minimum sustainable flows
(Kretschmer et al. 2017). However, allocations of water to
rights obtained for instream flows usually fall below the
legally permissible value of the rights, resulting in sub-
stantial shortages. Similarly, in America ‘senior’ water
rights established earlier in history out-rank the reliability of
more recently established ‘junior’ rights, and environmental
flow portfolios include both products. Much like the case of
the MDB, portfolios of water products of variable reliability
often fail to produce target yields. For example, in the
drought year of 2015, actual available stream flow to the
Whychus Creek was <60% of the baseline target, despite
the fact that 90% of the target water rights had been secured
for environmental watering (Kendy et al. 2018). The
shortfall indicates the low reliability of the water rights
portfolio. Thus, the reliability of environmental water rights
is as critical to the success of environmental management as
the actual acquiring of water rights, particularly in drought
affected regions. The challenges and implications presented
in our analysis also apply to any resource management
scheme that involves bundling ecological assets of variable
quality together to achieve a target amount of high-quality
ecosystem, such as biodiversity offsetting (Apostolopoulou
and Adams 2017) and mitigation wetland banking (e.g.,
Hallwood 2007).
‘Sub-Prime’ Water
Under the Basin Plan, the target for water recovery is to
hold enough water entitlements to produce an annual
average yield of 2075 GL. To achieve this goal, to date a
portfolio of more than 2800 GL of entitlements has been
acquired (with ongoing efforts to recover additional
Fig. 2 The average annual percentage per Megalitre (ML) of ‘Medium
security’ entitlements allocated in Queensland between 2002 and
2018, ‘General security’ entitlements allocated in New South Wales
between 2004 and 2018, and ‘Low security’ entitlements allocated in
Victoria between 2007 and 2018. The dotted line represents the end of
the Millennium Drought. P values in the Key demonstrate that the
amount of water allocated to ‘General’ security entitlements in New
South Wales, and ‘Low’ security entitlements in Victoria, as a pro-
portion of 1ML, was not significantly different in years following the
drought, compared with drought years. The amount of ‘Medium
security’ entitlements allocated in Queensland was greater after the
drought, compared with drought years
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volumes of water), including both ‘High Security’ and ‘Low
Security’ entitlements. The underlying assumption is that on
average, ‘Low Security’ entitlements should produce a
reliable yield equivalent to approximately half the amount
of ‘High Security’ entitlements. Thus, 1 GL of water can be
obtained by purchasing 2 GL worth of ‘Low Security’
entitlements. We suggest that this approach to implement-
ing the Basin Plan is analogous to the ‘sub-prime’ mortgage
market in the lead-up to the global financial crisis (GFC).
This comparison is not intended to diminish the validity of
Australian water policy. Rather, the lessons learnt by the
finance sector after the GFC offer some options for
improving the reliability of environmental water, and
increasing public confidence in the Basin Plan.
In this analogy, the methods used to recover water are
comparable to the creation of financial products, known as
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), by finance firms in
the years preceding the GFC. A CDO is a pooled collection
of cash-flow generating assets, such as mortgages, of
varying degrees of security (Longstaff and Rajan 2008).
These assets include BBB-rated mortgages, defined as
mortgages with a high risk of payment default and AAA-
rated mortgages, defined as those mortgages with a high
probability of reliable payment. A CDO, comprising both
BBB and AAA mortgages, is divided into shares and sold
on the basis that the risk associated with low security assets
is distributed evenly between investors. Prior to the GFC,
firms created CDOs from low-yielding BBB-rated mort-
gages (Fender et al. 2008). As these sub-prime mortgages
began to fail, the cash-flow yield of CDOs fell dangerously
below the expected return.
There are two points of comparison that offer important
insights into the future sustainability of the CEWH portfo-
lio. Firstly, much like the content of CDOs, the security of
the water purchased by the CEWH under the Basin Plan
varies considerably. Similar to mortgages, some entitle-
ments are ‘High Security’ (equivalent to AAA-rated mort-
gages), while others are ‘Low Security’ (equivalent to BBB-
rated mortgages) (Ancev 2015). Nearly 40% of entitlements
held by the CEWH are low-yielding assets. Thus, we sug-
gest that, like the content of CDOs, the portfolio is ‘sub-
prime’, and poses considerable risk to achieving target
environmental flows in the MDB. Secondly, in the case of
the finance sector, ‘the failure of markets to recognise
systemic disequilibria because of cognitive bias’ (Ülgen
2013, p. 498) played a large role in destabilising the
mortgage market. In this context, cognitive bias refers to the
tendency for cohesive groups, such as policy makers, to
reinforce their own beliefs by selecting information that
concurs with desirable world-views, while excluding alter-
native perspectives, and associated information, from
decision-making forums (Palley 2009). Bias of this nature is
the subconscious outcome of institutional norms within
complex economic systems, and transcends the intention,
purpose and responsibility of any individual, government or
organisation. Thus, the financial crisis of 2008 was due to
the failure of institutions to question and challenge domi-
nant paradigms, such as that future trends in the house
market would reflect past trends (Ülgen 2013). In the fol-
lowing we examine some of the characteristics of the
Australian water market, suggest that similar ‘systemic
disequilibria’ threatens the future availability of environ-
mental water in the MDB, and offer some suggestions for
improving the reliability of environmental water.
Risks to the Future Availability of Environmental
Water
An assumption of the current approach to securing envir-
onmental water in Australia is that the estimated yields will
reflect the future availability of water. Importantly, ‘Low
Security’ entitlements purchased from basins in New South
Wales account for nearly 40% of the total registered enti-
tlements held by the CEWH for the Basin Plan (Table 3).
Based on MDBA modelling, ‘Low Security’ entitlements
are expected to yield 0.5/ML, thus, twice the amount of
entitlements are required to achieve target yields. The
CEWH register indicates that, of the target of
2,075,000 ML, ‘High Security’ entitlements are expected to
yield 837,353ML, while ‘Low Security’ entitlements are
expected to yield only 623,977ML, leaving a shortfall of
161,640ML, or ~161 GL. Based on the modelling para-
meters, an additional 322 GL of ‘Low Security’ holdings
would be required to yield this amount and meet the target
of 2075 GL. Thus, currently, the CEWH portfolio is only
partly ‘hedged’ against the risk associated with ‘Low
Security’ entitlements. However, the process of water
recovery for environmental purposes is ongoing, and resi-
dual short-fall may also be accounted for by entitlements
held by state authorities rather than the CEWH. Therefore, it
is possible that if future climatic conditions are similar to
the past 15 years that the target long-term annual average of
2075 GL may be available for environmental management.
In the context of climate change predictions, we suggest
there are substantial risks associated with the water enti-
tlements portfolio held by the CEWH that may threaten the
availability of environmental water. Similar risks may apply
in other regions impacted by climate change, such as
California where ‘junior’, low reliability water rights make
up a large proportion of the rights established for environ-
mental purposes (Kendy et al. 2018). In the lead-up to the
GFC, preference for high-risk ‘sub-prime’ products in the
finance sector reflected an underlying cognitive bias and
belief that the mortgage market was infallible (Ülgen 2013);
even during a recession enough people would continue to
prioritise repayments, and bonds would continue to yield
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profits. A similar ethos underlies current approaches to
delivering the Basin Plan; purchasing a large number of
low-yielding water entitlements should generate a reliable
amount of water over the long term. In both cases, con-
fidence in the efficacy of the approach rests on the
assumption that the future behaviour of complex systems
will be similar to that of a defined period in the past. Thus,
people will pay mortgages and, the next 100 years of
rainfall, river flow and dam storage will reflect the past
100 years.
In some respects, problems related to modelling
LTAAY, and assumptions about future water availability,
are characteristic of efforts to operationalise adaptive gov-
ernance to manage complex social-ecological systems
involving nonlinear environmental conditions and uncer-
tainty (Chaffin and Gunderson 2016; Folke et al. 2005).
Adaptive governance aims to achieve resilience, whereby
governance arrangements are capable of responding to
unpredictable change, rather than striving to prevent or
control the trajectory of social-ecological systems (Folke
2006). In the context of climate change, Boltz et al. (2019)
argue that water is the ‘master variable’; water availability,
and the capacity to implement genuine adaptive manage-
ment of water resources, will determine the resilience of
wider social-environmental systems. The MDB is a com-
plex system which represents many of the large-scale
challenges of adaptive governance in river basins globally
(Bischoff-Mattson and Lynch 2017). There is considerable
uncertainty about the impact of climate change on future
water availability in the MDB, and the allocation of water to
entitlements. This uncertainty constrains the ability of pol-
icy makers to implement adaptive governance in the MDB,
and for environmental management more generally (Rijke
et al. 2012). However, in the case of the Basin Plan,
LTAAY was knowingly modelled by intentionally exclud-
ing best available climate change predictions. This suggests
that political decision making is underlain by cognitive bias;
the implicit assumption that complex social, ecological and
economic systems will remain stable, and that future con-
ditions will mirror the past.
If future climatic conditions are more similar to recent
decades compared with long-term trends, our estimates
based on allocations to ‘Low Security’ entitlements over the
last 15 years suggest that the portfolio is likely to yield as
little as 1565.4 GL, which is a shortfall of 553 GL. Thus, in
the context of climate change, the amount of available
environmental water may fall below the target when rain-
fall, runoff and dam storage decline, resulting in reduced
allocation of water to ‘Low Security’ entitlements, and
lower than expected amounts of water available for envir-
onmental purposes. The Basin Plan offers a powerful fra-
mework for addressing over-allocation and redistributing
scarce resources to improve the condition of degraded
ecosystems and environmental assets. We believe these
ambitions can be realised by adjusting the CEWH entitle-
ments portfolio, and improving the reliability of
environmental water.
Improving the Reliability of Environmental Water
We are concerned that yields from ‘sub-prime’ or ‘Low
Security’ water entitlements will remain low, or decline in
future years. We have two recommendations for improving
the reliability of environmental water. The first is for the
MDBA to re-model LTAAY using the best available sci-
ence about future climate scenarios and possible impacts on
surface water availability in the MDB, such as the IPCC’s
Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014). The MDB is
recognised as a likely hot-spot for water security vulner-
ability by 2050, under a medium emissions scenario.
Modelling of the amount of ‘Low Security’ entitlements
required to yield an equivalent amount of ‘High Security’
entitlements should be based on predicted near-term and
long-term risks to water resources associated with warming
and drying. It is likely that recalculating LTAAY to include
future climate change predictions would probably lower the
expected reliability of ‘Low Security’ entitlements, and
necessitate an expansion of the CEWH portfolio.
Our second recommendation is to review how climate
change will impact different water security products using
the historic allocation data presented in this paper, and, on
this basis, to hedge more effectively against any risk in
changes to reliability. If climate and rainfall remain similar
to the past 100 years and ‘Low Security’ entitlements yield
0.5/ML, the target annual average amount of 2075.4 GL
could be achieved by either hedging ‘Low Security’ enti-
tlements in their entirety by purchasing an additional
322 GL worth of these entitlements, or by purchasing an
additional 161 GL of ‘High Security’ entitlements.
However, climate projections suggest that future yields
will reduce. There has to date been no formal analysis of
how different water products (‘High’ and ‘Low’ security)
will fair under different climate change scenarios. In dif-
ferent river basins, the water sharing arrangements will have
differing implications for future security of these products
(Horne 2017). To further complicate things, the above cap
water, which is currently providing environmental benefits
and was considered in setting the water recovery target for
the environment, may take a larger hit from climate change
than any water entitlements. Furthermore, recent observa-
tions about catchment rainfall–runoff relationship changes
during the Millennium Drought suggest future dry periods
may produce significantly less runoff than previously
expected (Saft et al. 2015, 2016). The Basin Plan process is
adaptive allowing reviews at regular intervals. We recom-
mend that the next Basin Plan review incorporate an
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assessment of the security of supply of different water
products under climate change, and that this be done using
stochastic data to allow a probabilistic assessment of yield.
As a very preliminary assessment, future climate and
rainfall could be considered to be similar to the past 15
years and the Millennium Drought, during which time ‘Low
Security’ entitlements yield between 0 and 0.4, and average
of 0.2/ML. If this were the case, the shortfall between the
target of 2075.4 GL and actual yields from ‘Low Security’
entitlements may be up to 511 GL. Given that ‘Low
Security’ entitlements are likely to yield only 0.2/ML, an
additional 2755 GL worth of these entitlements, or 511 GL
of ‘High Security’ entitlements would be required to make
up the short-fall.
Figure 2 indicates that if a larger number of ‘Low
Security’ entitlements are purchased to hedge the existing
portfolio, it may also be possible to reduce the amount of
entitlements required by acquiring these entitlements from
river basins in Queensland, where these entitlements are
typically higher yielding (0.6/ML) compared with Victoria
(0.2/ML) and NSW (0.2/ML). However, the MDB recovery
target includes sub-basin targets, which may limit sub-
stitution between states. Importantly, our analysis demon-
strates that, in contrast to Victoria and NSW, there was a
significant difference between allocations to ‘Low Security’
entitlements in Queensland during and after the Millennium
Drought. Allocations to ‘Low Security’ entitlements
remained considerably higher than equivalent allocations in
other states of the MDB. However, we have not investigated
the socio-political consequences of purchasing a large
number of entitlements from a single basin or region, and
would advise caution to avoid negative consequences for
farming communities. Furthermore, there is a need to access
all types of allocations across all sub-catchments as our
analysis (Table 2) is limited to ‘Low Security’ entitlements
(as opposed to other entitlements, such as ‘Bulk’ entitle-
ments), and limited to entitlements held for the purpose of
environmental watering.
The options we present to improve the reliability of
environmental water, by either re-model LTAAY or by
using historic allocation data to estimate shortfall, both
involve revisiting the CEWH portfolio. Both options could
be achieve by purchasing a combination of ‘Low Security’
and ‘High Security’ assets, depending on how the expected
yield of ‘Low Security’ entitlements is calculated.
Conclusion
Securing water for environmental purposes in over-
allocated river basins is a global challenge. Water markets
offer a mechanism for reallocating resources, however, to
be effective, environmental water rights must be reliable. In
Australia, Chilé (e.g., Kretschmer et al. 2017), America
(e.g., Kendy et al. 2018) and elsewhere (e.g., Escriva-Bou
et al. 2020), environmental water rights are typically less
reliable than agricultural water rights. Our findings indicate
that the CEWH is probably over-reliant on ‘Low Security’
entitlements to deliver environmental flows in the MDB.
We recommend adopting methods established by the
finance sector to reduce the risk associated with low-
yielding products, including ‘hedging’ ‘Low Security’
entitlements. This could be achieved by purchasing an
additional 322–2755 GL of ‘Low Security’ entitlements, or
an additional 160–511 GL of ‘High Security’ entitlements,
depending on future climate scenarios. Other regions that
are likely to be similarly impacted by climate change, such
as California, may face similar challenges associated with
the declining reliability of ‘Low Security’ water entitle-
ments (known as ‘junior’ rights in America) in the future.
The commodification of natural resources, including
water, is one of the most lucrative investment frontiers of
the 21st century. The challenges facing the implementation
of the Basin Plan, and ‘Low Security’ water entitlements,
are highly characteristic of what Sullivan (2013) refers to as
the ‘financialization of environmental conservation’. There
are both strengths and weaknesses of using economic
approaches to manage scarce natural resources, however,
some approaches involve greater risks than others. For
example, while carbon offsetting is an imperfect science
(Bumpus & Liverman, 2008), the link between offset
licences and reducing carbon emissions is transparent. In
contrast, the link between financial products and natural
resources that encompass the Australian water market is
much less transparent. Characteristics, including the vari-
able reliability of products, and the uncertainty around the
yields of those products, emulate Wall Street finance in the
lead up to the GFC. In particular, there are similar risks
associated with using ‘Low Security’ water entitlements for
the Basin Plan, and underwriting CDOs with sub-prime
mortgages. In both cases, the expected yield of high-risk
products was calculated on the premise that future condi-
tions will be similar to average conditions in the past.
In the context of climate change, it is possible that future
decades in Australia’s MDB will be considerably dryer than
the past 100 years (Dey et al. 2019). If this scenario even-
tuates, ‘Low Security’ entitlements may yield significantly
less water than models anticipate. This outcome could also
affect the ability of irrigators who rely on ‘Low Security’
entitlements to plan for the coming agricultural season
(Khan et al. 2010). In his recent report to the Governor of
South Australia, Commissioner Bret Walker (2019)
recounted two opposing impressions from his experience of
conducting the Royal Commission:
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‘The first. is of admiring praise for the enactment of
the Water Act 2007….The second is one of deep
pessimism whether the objects and the purposes of the
Act and the (Basin) Plan will be realised’. (p.11).
We suggest that it is entirely possible to achieve the
objectives of the Basin Plan by adjusting the water enti-
tlement portfolio held by the CEWH. This would involve
remodelling LTAAY, further hedging of ‘Low Security’
entitlements, or purchasing additional ‘High Security’
entitlements, or a combination of these options. To date, the
issue of entitlement security has featured very little in
debates about the implementation of the Basin Plan. A
significant opportunity exists in the next Basin Plan review
to explicitly consider the implications of climate change on
the security of supply for different water products. This
would help to inform and improve the water recovery
approach and the reliability of the CEWH portfolio, and
restore faith in the capacity of the Basin Plan to achieve
environmental outcomes.
The evolution of market-based approaches for managing
natural resources, including the distribution of water,
reducing carbon emissions and preventing the net loss of
wetlands, is an international phenomenon. However, market
principles are not always directly transferrable to natural
landscapes, and present challenges for ecological restora-
tion. Many of these challenges are similar to those experi-
enced in the finance sector. As such, finance economics may
also offer avenues for overcoming challenges, and achiev-
ing the objectives of environmental policy. Water man-
agement in river basins is often framed as a tug-of-war
between two adversaries: farmers and the environment. In
reality, mismanagement will have negative implications for
both. A more useful juxtaposition is between current com-
pared with future goals and priorities. In the case of the
MDB, without adjustment, the existing environmental water
portfolio may result in the need for more drastic measures in
the future, such as reduced allocations to both environ-
mental and irrigation entitlements.
The Australian example, and our suggestions for
improving the security of environmental water in the MDB,
also offer insight about preventing similar situations from
arising in other regions. For example, in the case of Cali-
fornia, it may be necessary to ‘hedge’ low-yielding ‘junior’
rights with more secure ‘senior’ rights. The climate is
changing. Now is the time to increase the reliability of
environmental water and, in doing so, safeguard future
allocations for farming communities and ecological recovery.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflict
ofinterest.
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as
long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended
use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted
use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Ancev T (2015) The role of the commonwealth environmental water
holder in annual water allocation markets. Aust J Agric Resour
Econ 59(1):133–153
Apostolopoulou E, Adams WM (2017) Biodiversity offsetting and
conservation: reframing nature to save it. Oryx 51(1):23–31
Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy
(2019) Environmental water holdings. http://www.environment.
gov.au/water/cewo/about/water-holdings
Bischoff-Mattson Z, Lynch AH (2017) Integrative governance of
environmental water in Australia’s Murray–Darling Basin: evolving
challenges and emerging pathways. Environ Manag 60(1):41–56
Boltz F, Poff NL, Folke C, Kete N, Brown CM, Freeman SSG, Matthews
JH, Martinez A, Rockström J (2019) Water is a master variable:
solving for resilience in the modern era. Water Security 8:100048
Brown PH, Lant CL (1999) The effect of wetland mitigation banking on
the achievement of no-net-loss. Environ Manag 23(3):333–345
Bumpus AG, Liverman DM (2008) Accumulation by decarbonization
and the governance of carbon offsets. Economic Geogr 84
(2):127–155
Burgin S (2008) BioBanking: an environmental scientist’s view of the
role of biodiversity banking offsets in conservation. Biodivers
Conserv 17(4):807–816
Chaffin BC, Gunderson LH (2016) Emergence, institutionalization and
renewal: rhythms of adaptive governance in complex social-
ecological systems. J Environ Manag 165:81–87
Commissioner Bret Walker SC (2019) Murray–Darling basin royal
commission report. Government of South Australia, Adelaide,
South Australia
Coralie C, Guillaume O, Claude N (2015) Tracking the origins and
development of biodiversity offsetting in academic research and
its implications for conservation: a review. Biol Conserv
192:492–503
Craik W, Cleaver J (2008) Modern agriculture under stress—Lessons
from the Murray-Darling. The Murray-Darling Basin Commis-
sion. MDBC Publication, 46(08)
Cosier P, Davis R, Flannery T, Harding R, Hughes L, Daroly D, Pos-
singham H, Purves R, Saunders D, Thorn B, Williams, J, Young, M
(2012) Wentworth Group evaluation of the proposed basin plan.
Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists, Sydney, Australia
Costanza R, Cumberland JH, Daly H, Goodland R, Norgaard RB
(1997) An introduction to ecological economics. CRC Press, St.
Lucie Press and ISEE, Florida
Cox W, Baxter P, Flett D (2006) Review of the living Murray
implementation 2004/05. Report of the Independent Audit Group,
Australian Government
Environmental Management
Crase L, O’Keefe S, Kinoshita Y (2012) Enhancing agrienvironmental
outcomes: market‐based approaches to water in Australia’s
Murray–Darling Basin. Water Resour Res 48(9):W09536
Dey R, Lewis SC, Arblaster JM, Abram NJ (2019) A review of past
and projected changes in Australia’s rainfall. Wiley Interdiscip
Rev: Clim Change 10(3):e577
Endo T, Kakinuma K, Yoshikawa S, Kanae S (2018) Are water
markets globally applicable? Environ Res Lett 13(3):034032
Escriva-Bou A, McCann H, Hanak E, Lund J, Gray B, Blanco E,
Jezdimirovic J, Magnuson-Skeels B, Tweet A (2020) Water
accounting in western US, Australia, and Spain: comparative
analysis. J Water Resour Plan Manag 146(3):04020004
Eskeland GS, Devarajan S (1996) Taxing bads by taxing goods:
pollution control with presumptive charges. The World Bank
Fender I, Tarashev NA, Zhu H (2008) Credit fundamentals, ratings
and value-at-risk: CDOs versus corporate exposures. BIS Q Rev
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1473651
Folke C (2006) Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for
social–ecological systems analyses. Glob Environ Change 16
(3):253–267
Folke C, Hahn T, Olsson P, Norberg J (2005) Adaptive governance of
social-ecological systems. Annu Rev Environ Resour 30:441–473
Garrick D, Siebentritt MA, Aylward B, Bauer CJ, Purkey A (2009)
Water markets and freshwater ecosystem services: policy reform
and implementation in the Columbia and Murray–Darling Basins.
Ecol Econ 69(2):366–379
Goulder LH, Parry IW (2008) Instrument choice in environmental
policy. Rev Environ Econ Policy 2(2):152–174
Grafton RQ, Horne J (2014) Water markets in the Murray–Darling
basin. Agric Water Manag 145(C):61–71
Guest C (2017) Chapter 2—Managing the river Murray: one hundred
years of politics. In: Hart, Doolan (eds), Decision making in water
resources policy and management—an Australian perspective.
Academic Press, Cambridge, USA
Hallwood P (2007) Contractual difficulties in environmental man-
agement: the case of wetland mitigation banking. Ecol Econ 63
(2–3):446–451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.11.015
Horne A, Freebairn J, O’Donnell E (2011) Establishment of envir-
onmental water in the Murray-Darling Basin: an analysis of two
key policy initiatives. Australas Water Resour 15(1):7–19
Horne J (2017) The politics of water reform and environmental sus-
tainability in the Murray–Darling Basin. Water Int 42(8):1000–1021
IPCC (2014) Climate Change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulner-
ability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group
II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. In: Barros VR, Field CB, Dokken DJ, Mas-
trandrea MD, Mach KJ, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada
YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy AN, MacCracken S,
Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds). Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, p 688
Kendy E, Aylward B, Ziemer LS, Richter BD, Colby BG, Grantham
TE, Sanchez L, Dicharry WB, Powell EM, Martin S, Culp PW
(2018) Water transactions for streamflow restoration, water sup-
ply reliability, and rural economic vitality in the western United
States. JAWRA J Am Water Resour Assoc 54(2):487–504
Khan S, Dassanayake D, Mushtaq S, Hanjra MA (2010) Predicting
water allocations and trading prices to assist water markets. Irrig
Drain 59(4):388–403
Kingsford RT (2000) Ecological impacts of dams, water diversion and
river management on floodplain wetlands in Australia. Austral
Ecol 25:109–127
Kretschmer N, Oyarzun R, Alvarez P, Arumi J (2017) Water market
and its effects on the sustainable management of water resources
in Chile. Eur Water 60:3349–3355
Lave R (2018) Stream mitigation banking. Wiley Interdiscip Rev
Water 5(3):e1279
Lave R, Doyle M, Robertson M, Singh J (2018) Commodifying
streams: a critical physical geography approach to stream miti-
gation banking in the USA. In: The Palgrave handbook of critical
physical geography. p 443–463, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71461-5_21
Leblanc M, Tweed S, Van Dijk A, Timbal B (2012) A review of
historic and future hydrological changes in the Murray–Darling
Basin. Glob Planet Change 80:226–246
Longstaff FA, Rajan A (2008) An empirical analysis of the pricing of
collateralized debt obligations. J Financ 63(2):529–563
Lovell H, Liverman D (2010) Understanding carbon offset technolo-
gies. N Political Econ 15(2):255–273
Marston L, Cai X (2016) An overview of water reallocation and the barriers
to its implementation. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Water 3(5):658–677
Murray–Darling Basin Authority (2011) The living Murray annual
implementation report and audit of the living Murray implmentation
2009–2010. Murray–Darling Basin Authority, Canberra, ACT
Murray–Darling Basin Authority (2012) Hydrological modelling to
inform the proposed basin plan: methods and results.
Murray–Darling Basin Authority, Canberra
Murray-Darling Basin Authority (2015) Annual Report 2014–2015.
MDBA, Australian Government
Murray–Darling Basin Authority (2019a) The basin plan. https://www.
mdba.gov.au/basin-plan/plan-murray-darling-basin
Murray–Darling Basin Authority (2019b) Progress on water recovery.
https://www.mdba.gov.au/progress-water-recovery
New South Wales Department of Industry (2019) Available water
determinations. https://www.industry.nsw.gov.au/water/alloca
tions-availability/allocations/determinations
Nordhaus WD (1993) Optimal greenhouse-gas reductions and tax
policy in the “DICE” model. Am Economic Rev 83(2):313–317
Nordhaus WD (1994) Managing the global commons: the economics
of climate change, vol. 31. MIT press, Cambridge, MA
Palley T (2009) A theory of Minsky super-cycles and financial crises.
IMK Working Paper 05-2009, Düsseldorf, IMK at the Hans
Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute
Pittock J, Finlayson CM (2011) Australia’s Murray–Darling Basin:
freshwater ecosystem conservation options in an era of climate
change. Mar Freshw Res 62(3):232–243
Poterba JM (1991) Tax policy to combat global warming: on
designing a carbon tax (No. w3649). National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research
Quiggin J (2001) Environmental economics and the Murray–Darling
river system. Aust J Agric Resour Econ 45(1):67–94
Qureshi ME, Grafton RQ, Kirby M, Hanjra MA (2011) Understanding
irrigation water use efficiency at different scales for better policy
reform: a case study of the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia.
Water Policy 13:1–17
Rijke J, Brown R, Zevenbergen C, Ashley R, Farrelly M, Morison P,
van Herk S (2012) Fit-for-purpose governance: a framework to
make adaptive governance operational. Environ Sci Policy
22:73–84
Robertson MM (2004) The neoliberalization of ecosystem services:
wetland mitigation banking and problems in environmental
governance. Geoforum 35(3):361–373
Saft M, Western AW, Zhang L, Peel MC, Potter NJ (2015) The
influence of multiyear drought on the annual rainfall‐runoff
relationship: An Australian perspective. Water Resour Res 51
(4):2444–2463
Saft M, Peel MC, Western AW, Zhang L (2016) Predicting shifts in
rainfall‐runoff partitioning during multiyear drought: Roles of dry
period and catchment characteristics. Water Resour Res 52
(11):9290–9305
Simpson L, Ringskog K (1997) Water markets in the Americas
(English). Directions in development. Washington, DC: The
Environmental Management
World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
274481468774582182/Water-markets-in-the-Americas
Sullivan S (2013) Banking nature? The spectacular financialisation of
environmental conservation. Antipode 45(1):198–217
Thompson CL, Supalla RJ, Martin DL, McMullen BP (2009) Evi-
dence supporting cap and trade as a groundwater policy option
for reducing irrigation consumptive use 1. JAWRA J Am Water
Resour Assoc 45(6):1508–1518
Ülgen F (2013) Institutions and liberalized finance: is financial stabi-
lity of capitalism a pipedream? J Economic Issues 47(2):495–504
Van Loon AF (2015) Hydrological drought explained. Wiley Inter-
disciplinary Reviews: Water 2(4):359–392
Victoria State Government Department of Land Water and Planning
(2019) Seasonal determinations. http://waterregister.vic.gov.
au/water-availability-and-use/seasonal-determinations
Walker K (1985) A review of the ecological effects of river regulation
in Australia. In: BR Davies, RD Walmsley (eds), Perspectives in
southern hemisphere limnology. Proceedings of a Symposium,
held in Wilderness, South Africa, 1984 Springer, Dordrecht,
p. 111–129, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5522-6
Walker K, Thoms M (1993) Environmental effects of flow regulation
on the lower river Murray, Australia. Regulated Rivers Res
Manag 8(1‐2):103–119
Wang Y, Wan T, Biswas AK (2018) Structuring water rights in China:
a hierarchical framework. Int J Water Resour Dev 34(3):418–433
Water NSW (2019) NSW water register. https://waterregister.wa
ternsw.com.au/water-register-frame
Zedler JB, Callaway JC (1999) Tracking wetland restoration: do
mitigation sites follow desired trajectories? Restor Ecol 7
(1):69–73. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1526-100X.1999.07108.x
Environmental Management
